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Abstract
According to the definition of the London Interbank Offered Rate
(LIBOR), contributing banks should give fair estimates of their own
borrowing costs in the interbank market. Between 2007 and 2009, sev-
eral banks made inappropriate submissions of LIBOR, sometimes mo-
tivated by profit-seeking from their trading positions. In 2012, several
newspapers’ articles began to cast doubt on LIBOR integrity, leading
surveillance authorities to conduct investigations on banks’ behavior.
Such procedures resulted in severe fines imposed to involved banks,
who recognized their financial inappropriate conduct. In this paper,
we uncover such unfair behavior by using a forecasting method based
on the Maximum Entropy principle. Our results are robust against
changes in parameter settings and could be of great help for market
surveillance.
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1 Introduction
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) was established in 1986 by the
British Banking Association (BBA), who defines LIBOR as “the rate at
which an individual Contributor Panel bank could borrow funds, were it to
do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in reasonable market
size, just prior to 11:00 [a.m.] London time”. Every London business day
each bank within the Contributor Panel (selected banks from BBA) makes
a blind submission (each banker does not know what the quotes of the other
Banks are) and a compiler (Thomson Reuters) averages the second and third
quartiles. In other words, LIBOR is the trimmed average of the expected
borrowing rates of leading banks. LIBOR rates are published for several
maturities and currencies.
Over the time LIBOR became a fundamental interest rate with three
main characteristics: (i) it was viewed as an (intended) measure of the
borrowing cost in the interbank market, (ii) before the financial crisis, it
was interpreted as a risk free rate and (iii) it is a signal of global credit
market conditions. Libor is enormously influential due to its use for the
valuation of financial products worth trillions of dollars ([3])
The way in which LIBOR is fixed is peculiar, because it does not arise
from actual transactions. It is not the result of the competing forces of
supply and demand. There is a panel of banks selected by the BBA. Each of
them should submit their best estimate according to the following question:
“At what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and
then accepting inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11
am?” ([5]). At some point, individual bank LIBOR submissions are often
regarded as a proxy for the financial health of the submitting entity. Usually,
an employee or group of employees responsible for cash management in a
bank are in charge of the daily submission to BBA. They should base their
submission on the money market conditions for the bank, and should not
be influenced by other bank divisions such as the derivatives trading desks.
A fair Libor could signals the state of the interbank money market, and the
central banks could act to alleviate frictions in it.
Until May 29, 2008 LIBOR was presumed a pretty honest estimation of
the borrowing costs of prime banks. On that day, [8] published an article on
the Wall Street Journal casting doubts on the transparency of LIBOR’s set-
ting, implying that published rates were lower than those implied by credit
default swaps (CDS). Investigations conducted by several market authorities
such as US Department of Justice, the European Commission, and the Fi-
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nancial Services Authority (FSA)1 detected data manipulation and imposed
severe fines to banks involved in such illegal procedure.
Several leading banks applied for leniency. Jurists use to say “confes-
sio est probatio probatissima”, i.e. confession is the best proof. Therefore,
we can accept that, at least, there was some kind of unfair individual sub-
missions or even worse, a collusion attempt by a cartel of banks. This
manipulation had two main objectives. On the one hand, low submissions
were intended to give the market a signal of the bank’s own good financial
health. If a bank steadily submits greater rates, this could indicate prob-
lems in raising money, generating concerns regarding a underlying solvency
problem. On the other hand, some low submissions could be aimed to earn
money from certain portfolio positions, whose assets are valued according
to LIBOR.
The effect of erroneous LIBOR extends beyond the financial markets.
In addition to provide a biased interbank lending cost, [11] affirms that
it corrupts a “key variable in the first stage of the monetary transmission
mechanism”.
The importance of a good pricing system is based on its usefulness for
making decisions. As Hayek [6] affirmed “we must look at the price system as
such a mechanism for communicating information if we want to understand
its real function”. If the price system is contaminated, but perceived as
pure, the effect could reach also the real economy, making it difficult to find
a way out the financial crisis.
This rate-rigging scandal made economists to examine the evolution of
LIBOR rates and compare it with other market rates. [12] documented the
decoupling of the LIBOR rate from other market rates such as the Overnight
Interest Swap (OIS), Effective Federal Fund (EFF), Certificate of Deposits
(CDs), Credit Default Swaps (CDS), and Repo rates. They hypothesize that
the reasons for the divergent behavior were due to expectations of future in-
terest rates and in the accompanying counterpart risk. [10] study individual
quotes in the LIBOR bank panel and corroborate the claim by [8] that LI-
BOR quotes in the US are not strongly related to other bank borrowing
cost proxies. In their model, the incentive for misreporting borrowing costs
is profiting from a portfolio position. Consequently, the misreporting could
point upwards in one currency and downwards in another one, depending on
the portfolio exposition. The evidence of such behavior is detected with the
formation of a compact cluster of the different panel bank quotes around a
1It is noteworthy that the Financial Services Act 2012 renamed FSA as Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA), raising the importance of “fair conduct” in financial markets.
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given point. [2] track daily LIBOR rates over the period 1987 to 2008.
In particular, this paper analyzes the empirical distribution of the Sec-
ond Digits (SDs) of the Libor interest rate, and compares them with the
uniform and Benford’s distributions. Taking into account the whole period,
the null hypothesis that the empirical distribution follows either the uni-
form or the Benford’s distribution cannot be rejected. However, if only the
period after the sub-prime crisis is taken into account, the null hypothesis
is rejected. This result puts into question the “aseptic” setting of LIBOR.
In a recent paper Bariviera et al. [4] the authors uncover strange changes in
the information endowment of LIBOR time series, as measured by two in-
formation theory quantifiers, namely permutation entropy and permutation
statistical complexity. Their results allow to infer some degree of manipula-
tion or, at least, changes in the underlying stochastic process that governs
interest rate’s time series.
Antitrust law enforcement is complex, because manipulation and fraud
can be elegantly camouflaged. An statistical procedure could hardly be ac-
cepted as legal proof in a court of law. However, its use by surveillance
authorities makes the attempted manipulation more costly and more dif-
ficult to be maintained. Consequently, we view our proposal as a market
watch mechanism that could make manipulation and/or collusion attempts
more difficult in the future. Additionally, an efficient overseeing mechanism
could increase the incentives to apply for leniency at earlier stages of the
manipulation ([1].)
The aim of this paper is to show that a forecasting method based on
Maximum Entropy Principle (MaxEnt) is very useful not only to produce ac-
curate forecasts, but also to detect some anomalous situations in time series.
In particular, we claim that, in absence of data manipulation, forecast accu-
racy should be approximately the same at all times under examination. On
the contrary, manipulation would produce more predictable consequences,
increasing the predictive-power of our model, that we apply here to LIBOR
and other UK interest rates.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our methodol-
ogy based on the Maximum Entropy method. Section 3 describes the data
used in the paper and deals with the results obtained with the proposed
methodology. Finally, section 4 draws the main conclusions.
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2 MaxEnt approach for predictions in time-series
In a recent paper, Mart´ın et al. [7] developed an information theory based
method for time series prediction. Given its outstanding results in approach-
ing the true dynamics underlying a given time series, we believe that it is a
suitable method to apply here. In order to make the paper self-contained,
we review below the description of the method, taken from [7].
The behavior of a dynamical system can be registrated as a time series i.e.
a sequence of measurements {v(tn), n = 1, . . . , N} of an observable of the
system at discrete times tn, where N is the length of the time series.
The Takens theorem of 1981 asserts that, for T ∈ R, T > 0, there exists a
functional form of the type,
v(t+ T ) = F (v(t)), (1)
where
v(t) = [v1(t), v2(t), . . . , vd(t)], (2)
and vi(t) = v(t− (i − 1)∆), for i = 1, . . . , d. ∆ is the time lag and d is the
embedding dimension of the reconstruction. T represents the anticipation
time and it is of fundamental importance for a prediction model.
We will consider (as in [[7]) and references therein] a particular represen-
tation for the mapping function of Eq. (1), expressing it, using Einstein’s
summation notation, as an expansion of the form
F ∗(v(t)) = a0 + ai1vi1(t) + ai1i2vi1(t) vi2(t) + ai1i2i3vi1(t) vi2(t) vi3(t) + . . .(3)
+ai1i2...inpvi1(t) vi2(t) . . . vinp (t) ,
where 1 ≤ ik ≤ d with 1 ≤ k ≤ np and np being an adequately chosen
polynomial degree so as to to series-expand the mapping F ∗. The number
of parameters in Eq.(3) corresponding to the terms of degree k depends
on the embedding dimension and can be calculated using combination with
repetitions, (
d
k
)
∗
=
(d+ k − 1)!
k!(d − 1)!
(4)
Accordingly, the length of the vector of parameters a, Nc, is
Nc =
np∑
k=1
(
d
k
)
∗
(5)
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The computations are made on the basis of a specific information supply,
given by M points of the series
{v(tn), v(tn + T )}, n = 1, . . . ,M. (6)
Given the data set in Eq. (6), the parametric mapping in Eq. (3) will be
determined by the following condition,
F ∗(v(tn)) = v(tn + T ) n = 1, . . . ,M, (7)
which can be expressed in matrix form as,
Wa = vT , (8)
where W is a matrix of size M ×Nc, whose n-th row is
[1, vi1(tn), vi1(tn)vi2(tn), . . . , vi1(tn)vi2(tn) . . . vinp (tn)] (Cf. Eq.(3)) and
(vT )n = v(tn + T ), for n = 1, . . . ,M . Shannon’s entropy, defined for a
discrete random variable, can be extended to situations for which the random
variable under consideration is continuous.
In order to infer coefficients which are consistent with the data we shall
assume that each set a is realized with probability P (a). Thus, a normalized
probability distribution over the possible sets a is introduced,∫
I
P (a) da = 1, (9)
where da = da1da2 · · · daNc and Nc is the number of parameters of the
model.
The problem then becomes that of finding P (a) subject to the requirement
that the associated entropy H be maximized, since this is the best way of
avoiding any bias. The expectation value of a, is defined by
〈a〉 =
∫
I
P (a)a da. (10)
Consider the continuous random variable a with probability density function
p(a) on I and I = (−∞,∞). The entropy is given by
H(a) = −
∫
I
P (a) ln P (a) da, (11)
whenever it exists, and the relative entropy reads
H = −
∫
I
P (a) ln
P (a)
P0(a)
da, (12)
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where P0(a) is an appropriately chosen a priori distribution.
This measure exhibits many of the properties of a discrete entropy but, un-
like the entropy of a discrete random variable, that for a continuous random
variable may be infinitely large, negative, or positive (Ash, 1965 [6]). We
characterize, via the entropic maximum principle, various probability distri-
butions, subject to the constraints Eq.(9) and Eq.(8) for the expectation 〈a〉
of a. The method for solving this constrained optimization problem is to
use Lagrange multipliers for each of the operating constraints and maximize
the following functional with respect to P (a),
J = −
[∫
I
P (a) ln
P (a)
P0(a)
da+ λ0
[∫
I
P (a)da− 1
]
+ λt
∫
I
[WP (a)a− vT ] da
]
,
(13)
where λ0 and λ are Lagrange multipliers associated, respectively, with the
normalization condition and with the constraints, Eq.(9) and Eq.(8).
Taking the functional derivative with respect to P (a) we get
∂J
∂P (a)
= ln
(
P (a)
P0(a)
)
+ 1 + λ0 + λ
tWa = 0, (14)
which implies that the maximum entropy distribution must have the form
P (a) = exp−(1 + λ0) exp(λ
tWa)P0(a) (15)
If the a priori probability distribution P0(a) is chosen to be proportional to
exp(−1
2
at[σ2]−1a), where σ2 is the covariance matrix, a Gaussian form for
the probability distribution P (a) is obtained, with
〈a〉 = −σW tλ (16)
Considering Eq.(8), the Lagrange multipliers λ can be eliminated:
λ = −σ−1(WW t)−1vT , (17)
and one can thus write
〈a〉 =W t(WW t)−1vT . (18)
The matrix W t(WW t)−1 is known as the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of
the matrix W (see [7] and references therein). Consequently, this result
shows that the maximum entropy principle coincides with a least square
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criterion. Once the pertinent parameter vector a is determined, it is used
to predict new series’ values, v̂(tn + T ))n=1,...,MP , according to
(v̂(tn + T ))n=1,...,MP = Ŵa, (19)
where Ŵ is the matrix of size MP × Nc (see Eq.(8)), obtained using v̂(tn)
values.
3 Data and results
We analyze the Libor in pound Sterling. The data span is from 01/01/1999
until 21/10/2008, with a total of 2560 datapoints. All data were retrieved
from DataStream.
In this section we present the results obtained using the methodology
proposed in Section 2. We consider the embedding dimension d = 4 and the
polynomial degree np = 2. The length of the vector of parameters, according
to Eq. 5 is Nc = 15.
We fit our model with M = 700 datapoints, corresponding to approx-
imately two and a half years beginning on 01/01/1999. Once the model’s
parameters were determined, we forecasted the rest of the time series, up to
21/10/2008.
In the figures 1 and 2 the original time series values and the predicted
ones are overlapped (blue and red refer to original and predicted values, re-
spectively) for different anticipation time values. The time-interval between
the beginning of the time series and the vertical dashed lines corresponds
to the model interval, used to estimate the parameters. The other part
corresponds to the out-of-sample forecasts.
In order to prove the robustness of our proposal we did forecast for
different anticipation times (T={7, 10, 13, 16} days).
We can observe in figures 1 and 2 that, as expected, during the model
interval period, the original and the predicted time series are very close. This
is the consequence of the adequate fitting power of the model. As is the case
for any forecast method, one tries to mimic the behavior of the time series to
be estimated. When we move into the (out of the sample) prediction interval,
we note that during the first months, our method behaves very well. We
expect that, as economic theory affirms, competitive prices should behave
randomly ([9]). Consequently, if we assume that the time series under study
is generated by a memoryless stochastic process, accurate forecasts are not
possible. In spite of the fact that the original time series changes, we can
see that the predicted time series is rather constant between 2002 and 2007.
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Figure 1: Original and forecasted time series for different anticipation times
This is the consequence of the stochastic nature of the original time series.
The prediction performance is very poor. In addition, the distance between
the original and the predicted series in this period increases monotonically
with the anticipation time, as expected. Surprisingly enough, beginning with
2007, our model begins to fit real data very well. Predicted time series moves
pari passu with the original one, even during the large increases during 2008.
A similar analysis can be done with reference to figure 3. In that figure, we
display the relative mean square error between the original and forecasted
time series, year by year.
What could make the same model to change its forecast accuracy in such
dramatic fashion? According to Wold’s theorem ([13]), a time series can be
separated into a deterministic part and an stochastic part. If the stochastic
part dominates the behavior of the time series, forecast is unsuccessful. This
is what we can observe between 2002 and the end of 2006. On the contrary,
beginning in 2007, and until the end of 2008, prediction becomes very ac-
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Figure 2: Original and forecasted time series for different anticipation times
curate. Given that the prediction model is the same for both periods, we
conjecture that the time series is dominated by a deterministic process in
the last of the two periods. Recalling the literature review of Section 1, we
can state that this result is an indirect proof of LIBOR manipulation. We
emphasize that such “manipulation” necessarily comprises the contamina-
tion of the time series with a deterministic device, which was detected by
the MaxEnt model.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we present a novel prediction method based on the MaxEnt
principle. Taking into account its previous performance ([7]), we believe it
is suitable for the study of the “Libor Case”. We study Libor time series
between 1999 until 2009. Based on the prediction accuracy of our method,
we are able to detect two distinctive regimes. The first one, extends be-
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Figure 3: Relative mean square errors
tween 2002 and the end of 2006. In this period the time series behaves as
predicted by standard economic theory, reflecting the random character of
prices in competitive environments. The prediction power is, consequently,
poor. The second time-period spans 2007 and 2008. In this period the time
series changes its regime, moving to a more predictable one. We can safely
think that a deterministic device was introduce into the Libor setting. This
situation takes place at the time that what was called by the newspapers
as the “Libor manipulation” one. As a consequence, our paper is able to
detect such manipulation, using exclusively data from Libor time series. We
would like to emphasize the relevance of advanced statistical models in mar-
ket’s watch mechanisms. Our results could be of interest to surveillance
authorities, given the importance of fair market conditions in free market
economies.
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